



Attacks on Drivers of International Heavy Goods Vehicles

Facts and Figures



*International
Road Transport
Union*

FOREWORD

Terrorist atrocities around the world have drawn increasing attention to the fragility of systems involved in the international movement of people and goods.

Moreover, legitimate trade has been used by criminals as cover for other illicit activities, including cargo and vehicle theft with or without attacks on drivers, illegal migration, drug trafficking, money laundering, Customs and transit fraud, movement of counterfeit goods and other offences threatening human health and life, the well-being of national societies and the international community. There is also the danger of the two “illegal worlds”, i.e. criminal and terrorist, becoming interfaced.


Today, security is, rightly, among the highest corporate priorities for those involved in the international movement of goods. However, it must be considered that facilitation of trade, hence transport, cannot be ignored, even when security considerations are high on the agenda.

The international Survey initiated by the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), predecessor of the International Transport Forum (ITF), and the International Road Transport Union (IRU) has targeted one of the specific concerns stemming from criminal activities: attacks on international drivers involving, almost systematically, the theft of the cargo, the vehicle and the driver’s personal belongings.

The results of the survey presented in this report are enlightening and they will help to understand the problem, clarify attack characteristics and dimensions, quantify the huge economic and other losses engendered by attacks and identify the best possible tools and means to protect international drivers’ life and health as well as their vehicles and the cargo in the load compartments. This, by hammering out the right response to incidents and implementing the best preventive measures by the driver, the transport company, shippers, Trade Unions, Authorities and many other actors concerned.

The IRU acknowledges that not all data from international truck drivers’ responses given to a questionnaire or in Face-to-Face interviews can be considered as the most reliable source of information on this delicate subject matter. The sporadic and therefore anecdotic evidence otherwise available today concerning attacks on drivers cannot be considered sufficient either. Therefore, the IRU trusts that the information collected, structured and analysed may be regarded as an attempt to broaden the knowledge about the unfortunately growing trend of attacks on drivers and other related crime.

We know that crime is a social issue. It does not mean however that we should just sit back and expect an external panacea to come to remedy this social plague. On the contrary, we all should act in our own domain. This is why we invite all actors involved to improve supply chain security in true Public- Private Partnership.



Martin Marmy
Secretary General, IRU

ATTACKS ON DRIVERS OF INTERNATIONAL HEAVY GOODS VEHICLES

FACTS AND FIGURES ¹

The Problem

Since the tragic events in the United States on 11th September 2001, it has been increasingly recognised that all transport modes are at risk from terrorism and crime. Those involved in road freight transport also face a number of specific challenges and increasing risks, which include theft of goods and vehicles, attacks on truck drivers, illegal immigration as well as smuggling. In addition to these often crime-related challenges, authorities and operators must remain vigilant to possible terrorist use or targeting of vehicles and infrastructure. These challenges – and their responses – pose serious daily problems for all actors involved in this sector: the drivers, transport companies, police / law enforcement agencies, authorities, politicians, trade associations, unions, insurers, truck stop operators and other players.

As this study demonstrates, the number of vehicle thefts and freight robbery incidents are not only a major security issue but appear to be increasing in many countries. This is why the need to protect drivers, their vehicles and the freight carried is now becoming an issue of increasing concern.

To date, however, information needed to better understand the nature and scale of the problem and its consequences on transport drivers, companies and the sector as a whole has been lacking and only anecdotal evidence of attacks on drivers has been available.

The apparent reasons for this are varied: drivers frequently do not inform the police of the attacks for multiple reasons such as language difficulty and lack of trust in authorities and insufficient information about where and to whom the attacks should be reported. When they are reported, these incidents are very often not centrally recorded or properly responded to.

Indeed in many countries a comprehensive policy and decision-making framework at local and national level is not yet in place to countervail spreading crime on the roads. It is necessary to point out that the increasing number of attacks on drivers of international heavy good vehicles results also from the fact that effective measures to fight crime, such as providing sufficient secure truck parking areas, a wider use of protective devices on board vehicles, setting up efficient and accessible incident reporting and recording structures, as well as raising awareness of police forces, are, in most countries, not or hardly implemented.

The study

To address these concerns the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT)² and the International Road Transport Union (IRU) began in June 2005 a joint survey on attacks on international HGV drivers.

This study is based on a survey of international HGV drivers, their managers and competent authorities conducted in 2005 and 2006. The survey was conducted through

¹ Order full text of the survey on the IRU's Bookshop at www.iru.org

² The IRU assumes full responsibility for the contents of this study. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport and its member countries.

an Internet based questionnaire and a series of random face-to-face interviews with HGV drivers in or near five locations: Berlin (Germany), Budapest and Szeged (Hungary), several locations near London (UK) and Turin (Italy) as well as several sites in Bulgaria. A total of 2 003 completed driver questionnaires have been analysed of which 1 275 were obtained from face-to-face (FTF) random driver interviews.

In addition to this experience, responses to specific questions were obtained from 248 transport companies and Authorities of 31 countries across Europe.

Objectives of the study

This study sets out to better ascertain the nature and scale of attacks on international HGV drivers operating in Europe and how governments are addressing this problem. Evidence of the magnitude of the problem, the methods used to carry out the attacks and costs in terms of both commercial loss and human suffering are explored. The report proposes practical recommendations for consideration and implementation by each 'actor / stakeholder' concerned.

Note on methodology and limitations of data provided

This document does not claim to be a broad scientific study. It presents the results of a survey carried out with 2,003 international drivers and supplemented by certain information from governmental authorities (31), companies (248) and some unions.

Table 1. **Drivers' Country of Residence ***

In order of survey representation level			Alphabetical order of countries		
Number of Drivers	Country	% of total surveyed	Country	No of Drivers	% of total surveyed
1	Moldova	0.04	Albania	11	0.54
2	Bosnia	0.09	Austria	8	0.40
2	Greece	0.09	Belarus	20	1.00
2	Switzerland	0.09	Belgium	20	1.00
3	Kazakhstan	0.14	Bosnia	2	0.09
4	Ireland	0.2	Bulgaria	301	15.02
4	Portugal	0.2	Croatia	8	0.40
7	Denmark	0.34	Czech Rep.	25	1.24
7	Latvia	0.34	Denmark	7	0.34
7	Slovenia	0.34	Estonia	27	1.34
8	Austria	0.4	France	170	8.48
8	Croatia	0.4	Germany	72	3.59
11	Albania	0.54	Greece	2	0.09
12	Serbia	0.59	Hungary	331	16.52
15	Macedonia	0.75	Ireland	4	0.20
16	Slovak Rep.	0.79	Italy	92	4.59
20	Belarus	1	Kazakhstan	3	0.14
20	Belgium	1	Latvia	7	0.34
24	Russia	1.19	Lithuania	42	2.09
24	Spain	1.19	Macedonia	15	0.75
25	Czech Rep.	1.24	Moldova	1	0.04
26	Ukraine	1.3	Netherlands	92	4.59
27	Estonia	1.34	Poland	226	11.28
42	Lithuania	2.09	Portugal	4	0.20
65	Romania	3.24	Romania	65	3.24

72	Germany	3.59	Russia	24	1.19
81	Sweden	4.04	Serbia	12	0.59
92	Italy	4.59	Slovak Rep.	16	0.79
92	Netherlands	4.59	Slovenia	7	0.34
92	Turkey	4.59	Spain	24	1.19
117	U. K.	5.85	Sweden	81	4.04
170	France	8.48	Switzerland	2	0.09
226	Poland	11.29	Turkey	92	4.59
301	Bulgaria	15.02	Ukraine	26	1.30
331	Hungary	16.52	U.K.	117	5.85
47	Unknown	2.52	Unknown	47	2.52
2 003	TOTAL	100 %	TOTAL	2 003	100

* All respondents (2003)

The findings of the study outlined below and more comprehensively in Chapter 9 should be considered in light of the data provided. A general lack of *reporting* of attack incidents immediately after the event by drivers and transport companies to the Authorities has led to a lack of recognition among authorities of the extent of the problem. Not recognised in policy at an international level and at a national level in many countries, attacks on drivers of international HGVs are only tracked and monitored in half of the countries reporting in the survey.


Furthermore, because of the relatively small size of the statistical sample, the study cannot be considered representative of all attacks in the region; many countries particularly concerned by the international road transport business in the Europe-Asia corridors particularly frequented did not supply answers or did not take part in the survey. The results of this survey must therefore be analysed with consideration for the inherent limits of the methodology used.

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

Taking into account the uncertainties of the information highlighted above, the key findings of the study include the following:

- Out of the total of 2 003 replies to the questionnaire, 476 primary attacks³ on drivers were reported during the survey.
- 227 attacks were recorded during the random Face-to-Face (FtF) interviews.
- 1 in 6 (or 17%) of all 1 275 random FtF interviewed drivers had suffered an attack during the past 5 years.

Graph 1. **Distribution of the Total Number of Attacks* by Year**




* Multiple attacks (684)⁴

³ For the purpose of this report, "primary attack" means one attack per driver (476 attacks in this report)

⁴ For the purpose of this report, "multiple attack" means all attacks identified in this survey, i.e. also more than one attack per driver (684 attacks in this report as compared to 476 drivers attacked once).

- 30% of the attacked drivers reported they had been attacked more than once.
- 42% of the attacks were reported to have occurred in truck parks and a further 19% of the attacks were at motorway service stations.

Graph 2. **Attack Locations ***



* Primary attacks (476)

** Number of reported incidents in the survey

- 21% of drivers reported that they had been physically assaulted during the attack.
- 32% of the drivers subjected to primary attacks (476) reported that the attacks involved the use of gas – almost 1 in 3 of the attacked drivers.


Table 2. **Attack Time Distribution***

Time	Number of Attacks	%
06:00 – 10:00	22	4.6
10:00 – 14:00	27	5.7
14:00 – 18:00	33	6.9
18:00 – 22:00	38	8
22:00 – 02:00	135	28.4
02:00 – 06:00	183	38.4
NOT KNOWN	38	8
TOTAL	476	100 %

* Primary attacks (476)


- The vehicle and its load were targeted in 63% of the attacks, and/or 43% of the attacks were related to the theft of the driver's personal belongings. Examples of drivers' possessions stolen include personal documents, money and credit cards, mobile phones, TVs, even clothing.

Graph 3. Preferred Crime Targets *



* Primary attacks (476); figures do overlap

Graph 4. Types of Stolen Cargo



Examples of "Other" cargo: livestock, machinery, removals, building supplies.

- According to drivers surveyed, countries that have the largest number of reported attacks *as compared to the international road freight traffic they generate and receive* include Romania, Hungary, Poland and the Russian Federation.

Table 3. **Number of Attacks* by International Traffic Intensity by country**

Country	Number of attacks mentioned in the study (2000-2005)	Total traffic, millions of tonnes (2004)	Attack per millions of tonnes
Germany	23	268.9	0.09
Belgium	64	163.7	0.39
Spain	70	80	0.88
France	140	182.6	0.77
Hungary	21	16	1.31
Italy	85	104.5	0.81
Poland	39	32.1	1.21
Romania	31	6.2	5.03
U.K.	55	60	0.92
Russia	34	35.1	0.97

* Multiple attacks (684)

Table 4. **Areas of high incidence of attack***

Country	Number of attacks mentioned in the study (2000-2005)
Belgium	Antwerp and Brussels
France	Lyon, Marseille, Paris
Italy	Milan, Naples, Padua, Turin, Udine
Latvia	Riga
Poland	Warsaw
Russia	Chelyabinsk, Moscow
Spain	Barcelona, La Jonquiere, Madrid
UK	Birmingham, London

* Multiple attacks (684)

- 30% of the attacked drivers did not call the police, citing lack of trust in authorities (12%), language difficulties (5%) and fear of consequences (1%) as some of the reasons, whilst 21% of the drivers felt that the authorities paid 'no attention' to their reported attack and in only 2% of the attacks did police action result in arrests.

Table 5. **Reasons for not Reporting Attacks to the Police**

Reason	Number of Attacks	%
Lack of trust in authorities	55	11.56
Language difficulties	25	5.25
Fear of Consequences	7	1.47
Other	54	11.34
No comment	335	70.38
Total	476	100

- 35% of attacked drivers said their experience had affected their working life and 25% reported that the attack had had an impact on their personal life, with 9% of the drivers seeking medical and / or psychological attention as a direct result of the attack.

Table 6. **Driver Recovery Time ***

Time to Resume Work	Number of Drivers	%
Carried on Driving	112	23.53
1 Day	108	22.69
2 Days	9	1.89
3 Days	22	4.62
1 Week	18	3.78
2 Weeks	8	1.68
Longer	22	4.62
No Comment	177	37.19
Total (primary attacks)	476	100 %


* Primary attacks (476).

- 18% of the drivers reported that the support provided by their company was, in their view, adequate.
- The reported direct cost of the total primary attacks (476) recorded during the survey over the previous 5 years is estimated to be approximately Euros 12 million, including theft of vehicles, load and drivers' personal belongings.
- Identified loss findings have been used to extrapolate attack / incident and cost figures to the international driver population. The extrapolated value represents a loss of more than EUR 7 billion over the investigated period (2000-2005).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Political will, stakeholder engagement and industry involvement are required in *Public Private Partnership* to develop a better understanding of the problem of attacks on drivers with solutions tailored to local needs.
2. *Crime is moving fast* on to new or different targets, thus affecting transport and trade in many different and often unexpected ways. Latest crime trends, patterns of criminality and criminal modus operandi should be studied on a continuous basis drawing appropriate conclusions and improving tools of fighting against them. *Law* against crime should efficiently be enforced.
3. All stakeholders have a role in improving the *reporting, monitoring and recording* of attack incidents. Better data availability and reliability is needed in order to better ascertain the nature and extent of this problem.
4. National Police *Road Freight Crime Units* or similar types of organisational arrangements should be established to fight crime on the roads.

5. A network of safe and secure *truck parking facilities* at all appropriate locations, especially along key routes, should be established, sustained and operated. On that matter, the road transport industry has already taken measures to address the problem by issuing the regularly updated IRU-ECMT Truck Parking Areas publication, which is available to the public. The 2007 version gathers data from some 2000 parking areas in 41 European countries.



6. *Transport companies, shippers* should agree on using secure routes, including parking areas, to protect their personnel and securely deliver cargo to destination. They should take the needed measures to secure drivers and protect vehicle and cargo.
7. *Transport security awareness* should be enhanced through driver training and providing useful information to *drivers, transport companies, truck parking area operators and all other parties* concerned with crime prevention and reduction on the roads. In this respect, the implementation of health and safety regulations should be improved.
8. *Vehicles* should be equipped with robust security devices.

*Working together
for a better future*



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Attacks on Drivers of International Heavy Goods Vehicles Survey Results-Facts and Figures

The Survey has targeted one of the specific concerns stemming from criminal activities: attacks on international drivers involving, almost systematically, the theft of the cargo, the vehicle and the driver's personal belongings.

The results of the survey presented in this report aim to increase understanding of the problem, clarify attack characteristics and dimensions, quantify the economic and other losses engendered by attacks and identify the best possible tools and means to protect international drivers' life and health as well as their vehicles and the cargo in the load compartments.

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